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I'm delighted to be here today to give you an overview of the Independence 
Standards Board, but I need to remind you that my comments reflect my own 
views and not necessarily those of the Board. 
The Board was formed last year by the SEC and the AICPA because both the 
SEC and the profession have long wanted a better conceptual framework for 
independence rules for auditors of public companies, even if they may have 
somewhat differing ideas about the content of that framework. The mission of the 
ISB is to establish independence standards applicable to audits of public entities 
in order to serve the public interest and to protect and promote investors' 
confidence in the securities markets. 
In February 1998, the SEC issued Financial Reporting Release 50, which 
empowered the ISB. The FRR states that "...the Commission recognized the 
establishment of the Independence Standards Board and indicated that, 
consistent with its continued policy of looking to the private sector for leadership 
in establishing and improving accounting principles and auditing standards, the 
Commission intends to look to the ISB for leadership in establishing and 
improving auditor independence regulations applicable to the auditors of the 
financial statements of Commission registrants, with the expectation that the 
ISB's conclusions will promote the interests of investors." 
Since the federal securities laws were enacted in the 1930's, the independence 
rules have evolved in a piecemeal fashion, with no clear underlying set of 
principles. There are now more than 200 pages of published interpretations and 
"no-action" letters by the staff of the SEC, supplementing more than 50 pages of 
rules, plus interpretations and ethics rulings of the AICPA. The absence of clearly 
articulated principles, however, means that the rules can not be used to analogize 
by those seeking guidance for new situations. And there are, as you know, many 
new kinds of situations. This would include the manner in which companies 
generate financial data, the expanding scope of services offered by accounting 
firms, the relative size of the audit practice to the total firm, the growing 
involvement of spouses and other family members in the workplace, and the 
prevalence of teaming arrangements in the economy. In addition, the rules 
assume "one size fits all" - but what is appropriate for a 10 person firm in one 
small city is not necessarily appropriate for a firm of 20,000 people spread all 
over the country. Finally, the multitude of detailed independence rules makes it 
difficult to harmonize U.S. independence requirements with those of other 
nations. 
But despite its shortcomings, the current system has worked. Investors are 
comfortable in relying on published financial statements in large part because 
they have confidence in the integrity and objectivity - in the independence - of the 
auditor. Therefore, before we throw out what we have, we must be confident in 
what we are replacing it with- something that if anything better protects and 
promotes the public interest. 
The ISB's Specific Charges 
 Adopt the existing independence guidance of the SEC; this has been 
done and you should not expect significant change in the short term. 
 Develop a conceptual framework for independence applicable to audits of 
public entities that will serve as the foundation for the development of 
principles-based independence standards. 
 Promulgate standards, as appropriate, and review and ratify, if 
appropriate, consensuses of the Independence Issues Committee (IIC) 
and interpretations of the ISB staff that address matters involving auditor 
objectivity and independence. I'll explain more about the operations of the 
IIC and the staff in a few minutes. 
 Develop a process, including utilizing the IIC, for referring emerging 
issues affecting independence for guidance and resolution. 
 Provide a consultative function for practitioners and registrants who have 
questions about independence standards. 
The Board's Processes 
The Board's deliberative processes are conducted "in the sunshine" - the public is 
welcome to attend its meetings in person or to listen in by telephone. In its 
funding and in the openness of its processes, it is very similar to the FASB. The 
ISB, for example, is also required to issue exposure drafts of any planned 
pronouncements, and will issue invitations for comment and hold public hearings 
when warranted. 
Meeting agendas, meeting minutes, comment letters received on exposure drafts, 
correspondence on specific issues that are pending ratification or have been 
ratified by the Board, etc., are available for public inspection at the offices of the 
ISB and in the AICPA library. In addition, much of this material is available to the 
public on our website. 
To minimize overlap, the staff works with the AICPA's Professional Ethics 
Executive Committee, which will continue to provide independence guidance for 
auditors of all entities in this country. 
The SEC retains oversight responsibilities for the ISB's activities, and one way it 
discharges that responsibility is by having a seat at the table at all ISB and IIC 
meetings. The input of SEC officials is welcome and on several occasions 
already has been specifically solicited. 
With regard to harmonization of international independence standards, I believe 
the question is one of "when and how," rather than one of "if." Just as I believe 
we will eventually have one set of international accounting standards, I anticipate 
one set of international standards related to independence. This is clearly in the 
public interest: auditing is a worldwide profession; we have global companies and 
we increasingly have cross-border investors and lenders. The ISB's mission, 
however, currently relates only to auditors of public companies in the US. 
Consequently, for the time being coordination will consist primarily of being aware 
of what is happening elsewhere in the world, making the Board aware of such 
matters as it considers specific issues, and encouraging interested parties 
outside the US to comment on ISB exposure drafts. I have discussed this with 
both John Gruner of IFAC and John Hegarty of FEE and they are in agreement 
with this approach and this longer-term objective. 
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The Board itself is comprised of eight members - four representing the public and 
four from the accounting profession. William Allen, the Chairman, was for twelve 
years, until last June, the Chancellor of the Court of Chancery in Delaware, or, in 
other words, the head of what is generally recognized as the most important 
business court in this country. You can see from the positions held by the other 
members that this is a very senior body, and they have the experience and 
stature to place the proper emphasis on achieving the Board's mission. They are 
also taking their roles very seriously. In addition, and as previously noted, the 
Chief Accountant of the SEC or his or her designee has observer status at all 
Board meetings. 
The Board is an independent body. While it is funded by the AICPA SEC Practice 
Section, it sets its own budget and operates autonomously. The Board expects to 
sponsor research for its education and to better inform its decisions, and expects 
the staff to provide neutral analyses of subjects for possible Board consideration 
and action. 
The Independence Issues Committee (IIC) is comprised of nine members from 
the profession who have significant experience in independence matters. I serve 
as the Committee's non-voting Chairman and, just as at FASB's Emerging Issues 
Task Force, the SEC chief accountant or his/her designee serves as an observer. 
The Committee also operates in public, and generally meets monthly. Although 
the IIC will issue Issues Summaries and consensuses, just as the EITF does, 
unlike the EITF, an IIC consensus will not deemed "substantial authoritative 
support" for a position in the eyes of the SEC staff unless it is ratified by the ISB. 
The mission of the IIC is to: 
 Identify, on a timely basis, emerging independence issues for the Board's 
consideration within the framework of existing authoritative literature. 
 To address broader interpretative issues, including those that emerge 
from inquiries to the ISB staff, and communicate its consensuses to the 
Board and the public. 
 To conduct research. 
The staff's role is generally two-fold. First, we provide support to the Board and to 
the IIC in the development of the conceptual framework, standards, and in all of 
their other missions. Secondly, we receive and respond to independence 
inquiries from practitioners and others. While general inquiries may be made by 
telephone, official consultation requests are to be submitted in writing so that we 
may ensure that we have a complete and agreed-upon understanding of the 
issues. Only written requests and responses may be relied upon for SEC 
purposes, and then only by the parties involved. The SEC will not treat the 
specific response as authoritative for others until ratified by the Board. 
The ISB's activity-to-date has been primarily educational. At the Chairman's 
request, the auditing profession submitted a White Paper containing its 
recommendations to improve the current approach to determine auditor 
independence. This proposal was presented to the Board by its authors and the 
SEC staff was requested to submit its comments on the proposal, which they 
have done. The Board continues to consider these matters. In addition, the Board 
has heard presentations from academics, the SEC staff, the chairman and a 
former SEC Commissioner, members of the profession, financial analysts, and 
others on various independence-related topics. 
As part of the educational process, several financial analysts have been invited to 
an informal roundtable discussion later this month with several Board members to 
discuss any concerns they, as financial statement users, may have regarding 
auditor independence. A questionnaire describing some broad independence 
issues is being finalized and will be tested at that meeting, with the objective of 
issuing it publicly to solicit input from interested parties. 
At a special telephonic meeting of the Board on April 17th, the staff will propose 
that the Board take on some specific independence issues, even though a 
conceptual framework has not been developed. I believe this is desirable 
because first, there are some issues requiring resolution, but perhaps more 
importantly, the process of resolving issues will help all of us understand the need 
for, and the possible composition of, the conceptual framework. In addition, the 
solicitation of comments from the Board's various constituencies will deepen our 
understanding of what is important is this area - and why. 
The staff will specifically propose that the Board immediately take on the issues 
of family relationships and partners and staff joining audit clients, and in a few 
months also take on the issue of outsourcing - of all kinds.
I cannot predict, of course, whether the Board will be agreeable to taking on 
issues now, but this dual approach - working on a conceptual framework while 
dealing with specific issues - was employed successfully by FASB. 
Talking about a conceptual framework, we hope to make a presentation to the 
Board on an approach to that matter at the May meeting. Our preliminary thinking 
is to form a broad-based task force - with representatives from the user 
community, such as institutional investors and financial analysts, the profession, 
academe and corporations - to help develop a neutral discussion memorandum 
for Board consideration. After Board consideration and approval, that would then 
be sent out for public comments. With that input, the Board would then deliberate 
on the contents of a conceptual framework with the goal of issuing an exposure 
draft, again for public comment. At each stage of this process the Board would 
consider whether public hearings should also be held. After all of that, the Board 
would then again deliberate and conclude on the contents of an independence 
conceptual framework. 
Let me share with you some of my early thinking on the contents of a conceptual 
framework. The Broad issues include: 
 The investor's need for credible financial statements 
 The objectives of independence 
 The relationship of independence to objectivity and integrity 
 If there is a "reasonable investor" test, how that person might be defined 
In addition these are questions about what factors should be considered in setting 
independence standards. For example: 
 Should costs and benefits, if they can be measured, be considered 
 Can threats to independence be satisfied by firm specific safeguards, or 
compensating controls, and if so, when 
 When should the appearance of impaired independence be a factor, and 
how should that be determined 
 Is materiality a consideration in reaching - or applying - independence 
standards, and if so, how should it be measured 
 What do we mean by mutuality of interests and when if ever should it be 
considered a threat to independence 
 What is the role of firm codes of conduct and cultures? 
 What role, if any, in maintaining independence is properly assigned to 
corporate officers and directors, including the audit committee 
 And finally, what role should the profession's overseers, such as the 
SEC, the Public Oversight Board, the state boards of accountancy, and 
the AICPA play? 
We at the ISB have a major challenge ahead of us. However, this also is a unique 
opportunity, and I know I can speak for the Board in encouraging all who have an 
interest in the subject of auditor independence to fully participate in our 
processes. Only in that way can we be confident that we are best serving the 
public interest. And it is clear to me that an emphasis on the public good has 
been, and continues to be, in the best long-term interests of this profession. 
If you have further interests in our activities, our website 
(www.cpaindependence.org) contains information about the organization, its 
Board and IIC members, copies of speeches made by Board members and the 
staff, minutes of the Board and IIC meetings, and other helpful information. In 
addition, the website contains the form used to initiate a formal consultation with 
the ISB, and eventually, the site will contain the Board's independence 
interpretations, standards, exposure drafts, etc. 
Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. I'd be happy to use the last 
few minutes to answer any questions you may have about the Board or its 
processes. 
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